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Abstract: This article examines how Chinese middle-school history 
textbooks are written as a means of legitimising the rule of the Chine-
se Communist Party (CCP), by carefully utilising China’s past. The 
authors identify (or perhaps “construct”) a sinified model of good 
governance in the textbooks that derives from the teachings of Con-
fucius and Mencius, and the subsequent practises of certain revered 
Chinese emperors. This model is then applied to CCP leaders in the 
modern-era textbooks in order to cast them as diligently upholding a 
time-honoured Chinese tradition of legitimate rule. In a broader 
context, our analysis fits within the ongoing discussions about the 
continuing legacy of Confucianism in contemporary China and the 
CCP’s efforts to locate itself within this as a way of fortifying its own 
legitimacy. We also note how some of the themes of good govern-
ance contained in the textbooks are closely linked to contemporary 
government policies and priorities, such as anti-corruption schemes 
and constitutionalism. The objective in so doing is to propagate the 
importance of these themes to a young audience. 
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History has always occupied an important role in legitimising CCP 
rule, given the limited modes of legitimacy available under the single-
party authoritarian system. The harrowing memories associated with 
the First and Second Opium Wars (Lovell 2011; Weatherley and 
Rosen 2013), the Second Sino-Japanese War (Mitter 2000), and the 
Korean War (Hays Gries et al. 2009) are exhaustively documented in 
the annals of CCP history – and frequently articulated by the state-
controlled national media. The aim in so doing is to remind the Chi-
nese public that the CCP liberated China from imperialist subjugation 
in 1949, and remains the sole defender of Chinese national interests 
in the context of continued – albeit less frequent – aggressive foreign 
conduct. As an alternative to this approach, the Party has adopted a 
more conciliatory stance by emphasising its common historical ties 
with Taiwan’s former ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT, ୰ᅜᅜẸ
ඪ, Zhongguo Guomindang), as part of a placatory policy on reunifi-
cation with the island. This has included a recognition of the KMT’s 
achievements during China’s Republican era, and the contribution 
made by the KMT in ousting Japan from Chinese soil by 1945 
(Weatherley and Zhang 2017).  
Our article endorses the view that China’s history is pivotal to 
the legitimation of CCP rule. However, in a departure from the exist-
ing literature, we examine the history contained in Chinese middle-
school textbooks and show how it is deliberately designed to bolster 
the Party’s authority. In particular, we illustrate how concepts of 
“good governance” maintained by the CCP are portrayed as part of a 
unique Chinese tradition of rule practised for more than four centur-
ies now. This forms part of a wider effort by the Party to present 
itself as the standard-bearer of traditional Chinese values and ideas in 
an attempt to strengthen its legitimacy.  
As to the structure of the article, after examining the pivotal role 
that history textbooks play as a medium for political propaganda 
(irrespective of the underlying political system), and the methods 
used by the CCP in disseminating such propaganda, it identifies an 
authentically Chinese concept of “regime legitimacy” as put forward 
by Guo Baogang (2003, 2010). This comprises four key elements: rule 
by virtue, popular consent, legality, and equality. We then apply this 
concept to pre-modern-era textbooks (covering the period from the 
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so-called Peking Man to the end of the Qing Dynasty), specifically to 
the selectively cited teachings of ancient Chinese sage kings (Yao and 
Shun) and revered philosophers (Confucius and Mencius) – as well as 
the subsequent practises of historically admired Chinese emperors. 
Finally, we show how key figures in the modern history textbooks 
(covering the period from the First Opium War into the twenty-first 
century) – such as Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan), Mao Zedong, and 
Deng Xiaoping – are depicted as upholding these ancient modes of 
good governance during their respective political lifetimes.  
&&3/HJLWLPDF\DQGWKH/HJDF\RI
&RQIXFLDQLVP
The incumbency of the CCP has been characterised by a constant 
quest to legitimise its monopoly on political power. During the Mao 
era, attempts to derive legitimacy focused on the doctrine of Marx-
ism, mass participation in political and economic affairs, and the 
charismatic authority of Mao Zedong – as reinforced by a nationwide 
cult of personality. The dramatic failure of the Cultural Revolution 
forced the post-Mao leadership under Deng Xiaoping to jettison 
these discredited paradigms and move towards a performance-based 
concept founded on market economic reform and an open-door 
trading policy with the developed world. While this went some way 
towards resurrecting the Party’s popularity, the reforms spawned a 
number of unwelcome socio-economic side effects (e.g. spiralling 
inflation, unemployment, and chronic official corruption). These 
weakened the Party’s legitimacy, culminating in the ill-fated 1989 
demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and elsewhere in China. Since 
Tiananmen, the CCP has, as noted already, sought to expand the 
basis of its legitimacy by appealing to popular nationalism through 
historical memory, and by presenting itself as the party of stability (っ
ᇊ, wending) (Sandby-Thomas 2011).  
There has also been a concerted official focus on pre-modern 
Chinese traditions, specifically Confucianism – in what Ford terms 
the CCP’s “romance with the Sage” (Ford 2015: 1032). Ford (2015: 
1033–1034) further traces this back to the mid-1980s, when the 
Academy of Chinese Culture was established to see if Confucianism 
could somehow inform post-Mao socio-economic reform and mod-
ernisation. In addition, the Party set up a Chinese Confucius Research 
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Institute in 1985 while in November 1986 the 7th Five-Year Plan 
placed the study of modern Confucian thought at the very top of the 
research agenda for China’s social scientists.  
Since then, the emphasis on Confucianism has intensified, as the 
espousal of quasi-Confucian political themes became an important 
feature of the CCP’s legitimacy discourse. This has been done partly 
to counter the continuing public discontent with some of the socio-
economic problems familiar during the 1980s (Bell 2008: 8–9). But it 
is also intended to reinvigorate the Party itself, which, according to 
Lieberthal, was lacking an “energizing ideology motivating its mem-
bers to excel at public service and suffer personal self-sacrifice” 
(Lieberthal 2004: 323). Former president Jiang Zemin has frequently 
championed the Confucian principles of “social harmony” and “or-
der” (Lieberthal 2004: 352, 368). Indeed, during his 2002 Report to 
the 16th Party Congress, he referred directly to the importance of 
ruling the country by virtue (Jeffreys 2012: 146, 153) – a key Confu-
cian theme in the country’s history textbooks, and one that we will 
examine shortly. Jiang’s successor Hu Jintao developed these ideas in 
articulating his headline theory of “harmonious society” (઼䉀⽮Պ, 
hexie shehui), while Xi Jinping often cites the Confucian classics in 
explaining China’s domestic and foreign policy position (Zhao 2015). 
As Ford concludes, 
the promotion of the Party’s Confucianized political discourse 
[has become] a propaganda theme of high priority, intimately 
linked to the CCP’s need to develop and maintain a new theory 
for why it must continue to rule China uncontested. (Ford 2015: 
1036–1037) 
/HJLWLPDF\ZLWK&KLQHVH&KDUDFWHULVWLFV
The Party’s contemporary focus on Confucianism draws heavily on 
the celebrated Weberian (1964) notion of “traditional legitimacy.” 
This refers to the application of methods of governing that go back 
through the ages, and which are familiar to the populace. As Weber 
puts it, a government enjoys traditional legitimacy  
on the basis of the sanctity of the order and the attendant powers 
of control as they have been handed down from the past, [and] 
have always existed. (Weber 1964: 341)  
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Looking at it another way, the populace feel more comfortable with 
recognisable ways of ruling than they do with a complete overhaul of 
the system under which nothing is familiar. But, it is more than sim-
ply a question of political habit. Ideas and governance techniques are 
accepted on the grounds that they embody the accumulated wisdom 
of successive generations of leaders. As we will see below, the formu-
lation of an ancient Chinese model of good governance in middle-
school history textbooks, one that is then applied to the CCP, can be 
placed firmly with the framework of traditional legitimacy.  
Weber goes beyond traditional legitimacy to posit two other the-
ories of legitimacy: “charismatic” and “legal-rational.” The defining 
characteristic of an individual invested with charismatic legitimacy is 
the popular perception of that person as someone very special, with 
abilities that no ordinary person possesses. It is with reference to 
these exceptional qualities that the populace obey the directives of the 
charismatic leader. Conversely, legal-rational legitimacy refers to the 
established procedures by which decisions are made, laws are enacted, 
and office holders are appointed or dismissed. For a regime to be 
legitimate in legal-rational terms, it must adhere closely to these pro-
cedures. The application of legal-rational legitimacy is very apparent 
in China’s middle-school history textbooks, in keeping with the Par-
ty’s post-Mao emphasis on legal and constitutional reform. By con-
trast, charismatic legitimacy is much less pronounced – given its asso-
ciation with Mao’s discredited and disastrous personality cult.   
Another explication of legitimacy is provided by David Beetham 
(1991), who identifies the “electoral” and “mobilisation” modes of 
legitimacy. As the term suggests, the electoral mode is applicable to 
multiparty systems of democracy in which individual consent to rule 
is given at the ballot box – where there must always be a diversity of 
choice. By contrast, the mobilisation mode is more applicable to sin-
gle-party states where individual consent is expressed through the 
direct involvement of the masses in the implementation of a particu-
lar policy or political objective – which is designated by, and ultimate-
ly supportive of, the incumbent government. This has particular rele-
vance to the Maoist emphasis on the mass line and the mass cam-
paign (Weatherley 2006: 3–5), but is not mentioned in the history 
textbooks.  
While, in principle, legitimacy is a universal concept, its practical 
application is the source of debate among some scholars and is often 
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perceived (rightly or wrongly) as Western in orientation. According to 
Barker (2001: 43), this is partly due to the continuing influence of 
Weberian notions of legitimacy – which were originally based on the 
experiences of Western European societies and partly because Politi-
cal Science in general is biased toward multiparty democracy. The 
effect, according to Sandby-Thomas, has been to prioritise Weber’s 
legal-rational legitimacy “as the principal source of legitimacy” 
(Sandby-Thomas 2015: 98). This, in turn, “raises questions over the 
sustainability of applying legitimacy in non-Western countries, as it 
does not take account of specific political values and custom” 
(Sandby-Thomas 2015: 98). Some Chinese thinkers agree with this 
point, especially in relation to the Chinese experience. For example, 
Zhu Yuchao insists that gauging the legitimacy of the CCP by refer-
ence to the principles of “democracy” and the “rule of law” is inap-
propriate because such principles are “not part of China’s historical 
narrative and political discourse” (Zhu 2011: 129). Rather, “we need 
to reassess the traditional Chinese view of governance legitimacy” 
(Zhu 2011: 129).  
Guo Baogang (2003, 2010) undertakes this reassessment, setting 
out several different modes of legitimacy based on ancient Chinese 
thinking and applying them to post-1949 China. Although Guo is not 
necessarily the most prominent Chinese academic to have published 
on this subject, his ideas have particular utility for our analysis of 
Chinese history textbooks and can be usefully divided into the four 
following categories: rule by virtue, popular consent, legality, and 
equality. These will each be further explained below, in the context of 
pre-modern-era and modern-era history textbooks respectively.  
+LVWRU\7H[WERRNVDVDQ,QVWUXPHQWRI
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Before we examine the role of history textbooks as a disseminator of 
political propaganda, it is useful to assess the potential impact of 
Chinese education in general on the views of the country’s students. 
Studies by scholars such as Tang and Darr (2012), and more notably 
Kennedy (2009), have shown how the impact can be far reaching, 
particularly in relation to garnering support for the CCP. Using the 
“exposure–acceptance model” developed by William McGuire 
(1966), Kennedy shows how educated Chinese citizens who are polit-
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ically aware demonstrate high levels of political support for the Party – 
although citizens at the highest levels of education are less accepting 
of political messages, and tend to express lower levels of support for 
the CCP.  
Turning now to history textbooks, although some scholars dis-
agree (Vickers and Zeng 2017), it is widely thought that history 
school textbooks provide an ideal medium for the transmission of 
political propaganda, primarily because the readership is young and 
likely to be more susceptible to influence than an adult audience is. 
This susceptibility is enhanced because the information contained in 
the textbooks is usually conveyed as an unbiased presentation of the 
truth when, in fact, the exact opposite is the case – it is often heavily 
loaded with carefully constructed political messages. According to 
Apple, the inherent political bias of the history textbook is a universal 
phenomenon: 
The curriculum is never simply a neutral assemblage of know-
ledge, somehow appearing in the texts and classrooms of a nation. 
It is always part of a selective tradition, someone’s selective tradi-
tion, some group’s vision of legitimate knowledge. (Apple 1993: 22)  
In China, the “selective tradition” or “legitimate knowledge” woven 
into its history textbooks derives exclusively from the CCP, re-
nowned for its efforts to control the content and flow of information 
to suit its own political purposes. This official regulation of textbooks 
has been a constant ever since the Party first came to power, although 
the content of these has varied over time. In her study of the Chinese 
history curricula during the post-Mao era, Jones (2002) shows how 
historical narratives and teaching goals moved away from the radical-
ism associated with the Cultural Revolution and towards the more 
pragmatic and modern perspectives underpinning the reform era 
under Deng and Jiang. Baranovitch (2010) has detailed the changing 
representation of China’s national minorities to accord with changes 
in Party policy on this subject. Tse (2011) has identified textbook 
fluctuations in the portrayal of good citizenship, reflecting a post-
Deng soft authoritarianism and a greater reconciliation with human 
rights and global citizenship.  
Irrespective of alterations to content, one of the key objectives 
of China’s history textbooks has always been the same: to legitimise 
CCP rule. Wang refers to Chinese history education in general as  
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an instrument for the glorification of the party, for the consolida-
tion of the PRC’s national identity, and for the justification of the 
political system of the CCP’s one party rule. (Wang 2008: 784)  
Jones, meanwhile, insists that in China “history is primarily expected 
to promote acceptance of the political system, the current regime and 
its policies” (Jones 2002: 548).  
The process by which Chinese history textbooks are compiled 
shows just how closely the Party micromanages the content. At the 
initial drafting stage, the process is complex and protracted “involv-
ing curriculum developers, textbook writers and History teachers in 
constant renegotiation” (Jones 2002: 548). Also involved at this stage 
is the state-owned People’s Education Press (PEP) in Beijing, which 
is responsible for publishing the textbooks. Although the PEP has 
approval rights over the content of the textbooks, it is subordinate to 
the views of the State Education Department. However the final say 
goes further up the chain of command to the all-powerful Central 
Party Propaganda Department, in charge of ideology-related work 
and the information-dissemination system. The Propaganda Depart-
ment carefully vets the textbooks to ensure that they conform with 
the Party’s intended political message (Brady 2008). This provides a 
good example of how the Party continues to control the state in Chi-
na, notwithstanding the nominal separation of powers outlined in the 
current state constitution, as amended in 2004.  
The study of History is compulsory in China during the three 
years of middle school, encompassing Grades 7 to 9 (ages 12 to 15). 
World history is taught at Grade 9, and is not covered in this article 
mainly because, as Jones notes, there is “far less at stake politically” 
(Jones 2002: 550) for the CCP. Our focus is, rather, on the portrayal 
of Chinese history, which is taught in four volumes – two each for 
Grades 7 and 8. These volumes provide a comprehensive sweep of 
Chinese history. Volume 1 of the Grade 7 textbook begins about 
750,000 years ago and ends with the Northern and Southern Dynas-
ties (386–581). Volume 2 runs from the Sui Dynasty to the Qing 
Dynasty period (581 to the 1800s). We refer to these two volumes as 
comprising the “pre-modern era.” Volume 1 of the Grade 8 textbook 
runs from the First Opium War (1839–1842) to the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China. Volume 2 covers the post-revolutionary 
era, ending in the early twenty-first century during the incumbency of 
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Jiang Zemin. We refer to these volumes as comprising the “modern 
era.”  
The most recent editions of these history textbooks were pub-
lished in 2013, and it is these that we examine below. The 2013 edi-
tions are identical to the previous ones published in 2006, suggesting 
that the Party’s intended message about long-standing Chinese mod-
els of legitimacy has been consistent for some time now. Although 
some provincial publishing houses (e.g. Shanghai in 2006) have tried 
to significantly vary the content of Chinese history textbooks (Kahn 
2006), most of them replicate what is published by the PEP in Bei-
jing. In this way, unlike other categories of Chinese school textbooks 
(e.g. natural sciences and maths), the content of history textbooks is 
often “set in stone” rather than being subject to any local variation or 
reinterpretation.  
0HWKRGVRI,QGRFWULQDWLRQ
In terms of how the political message is disseminated, and as we will 
see in further detail below, the textbooks are deliberately compiled so 
that China’s pre-modern history acts as a precursor for the modern 
period. This ensures that, where necessary, students can draw useful 
comparisons between the past and the present, to form the intended 
impression that Chinese history is a seamless continuum. So, for ex-
ample, certain key events from the past are used to foreshadow later 
incidents. One example in Volume 2 of the Grade 7 textbook is the 
stinging criticism of censorship during the final throes of the Qing 
Dynasty (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013b: 101), which prepares stu-
dents for similar criticisms of the Cultural Revolution era during the 
Grade 8 course (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 94–95).  
More importantly for the purposes of this article, pre-modern 
modes of legitimacy are carefully prescribed in the early volumes to 
act as a template for good governance in the modern era. More often 
than not, this is reflected in the exemplary conduct of certain well-
respected Chinese emperors such as Tang Xuanzong and Tang Tai-
zong, both from the Tang Dynasty (618–907), and Han Wendi from 
the Han Dynasty (206 BC–AD 220). These and other revered leaders 
are depicted as setting lofty standards of rule that their modern suc-
cessors successfully emulated, most notably Mao Zedong and Deng 
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Xiaoping. The aim in so doing is to present CCP leaders as upholding 
a centuries-old tradition of virtuous rule.  
The use of exemplars drawn from history has a long and estab-
lished tradition in China as part of what Patricia Ebrey calls the “great 
man theory of history” (Ebrey 2010: 10), a belief that the develop-
ment of Chinese civilisation is attributable to the acts of great people 
rather than to gods or mystical figures. Similarly, Stefan Landsberger 
has noted that  
through the ages, models have played an important role in this edu-
cational process [in China], constantly making people aware of 
norms of correct behavior and acceptable conduct. (Landsberger 
2001: 541)  
This has been strongly reinforced in the modern era by the utilisation 
of the all-encompassing personality cult, particularly in relation to 
Mao and his short-lived successor Hua Guofeng.    
To reinforce the image of exemplary rulers and rule, the text-
books contain vivid visual representations of certain key figures in 
Chinese history that are carefully constructed to convey the desired 
message, both good and bad. For example, Volume 1 of the Grade 8 
textbook includes a photograph of Mao astride an appropriately 
powerful-looking white horse, leading a group of soldiers into Shan-
bei – the symbolic birthplace of Chinese communism (Renmin jiaoyu 
chubanshe 2013c: 89). Mao’s pose is quintessentially heroic in classic 
socialist-realist fashion, designed to strike awe into the reader. The 
title pages of several chapters in both volumes of the Grade 8 course 
contain photographs of other high-profile CCP leaders gazing reso-
lutely into the distance, including one of Deng Xiaoping (Renmin 
jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 37). Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the 
Chinese Republic and revered in both China and Taiwan, is photo-
graphed standing tall and proud in full military dress. Directly below 
him is a cartoon (traditionally, a derisory form of illustration) of Sun’s 
rival, the self-appointed “emperor” Yuan Shikai – one of the most 
vilified figures of the modern era. Yuan is pictured reclining smugly 
on his “throne,” so as to illustrate the chasm in moral status between 
him and Sun (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013c: 38).  
As we might expect, the textbooks are laden with poignant quo-
tations from the “great men” of Chinese history. Mao is frequently 
eulogised by reference to his poetry. In the chapter discussing the 
Long March (1934–1935), one of Mao’s poems is described as “cap-
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turing the revolutionary hero spirit of the People’s Liberation Army 
[(PLA)]” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013c: 59). The front page of 
another chapter is emblazoned with a sample of Deng’s calligraphy 
(Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 88). This is relevant because Chi-
nese calligraphy is traditionally used to commemorate the significance 
of an event, place, or individual (Little 1987). The textbooks also 
include verses from military marching songs used by the PLA to sus-
tain staff morale (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013c: 55), and pictures 
of the wild plants that were consumed by PLA soldiers during the 
Long March to illustrate their determination to survive the hostile 
surrounding environment at all costs (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 
2013c: 61).  
In the same way that the textbooks highlight positive aspects of 
China’s history so as to legitimise the current regime, so do they 
overlook – or seek to justify – the negatives. This brings us back to 
the earlier point about textbooks representing the selected tradition 
of its authors. So, for example, there is no mention whatsoever of the 
1989 militiary crackdown in Tiananmen Square. The Great Leap 
Forward is not ignored. Instead, it is explained away as little more 
than a tragedy of good intentions that was necessary to “fulfil the 
people’s ever-increasing material and cultural needs” but failed 
because “the party and the people did not have enough under-
standing of the stage of development of socialism in our country” 
and “were impatient for success” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013c: 
29). The failure of the Cultural Revolution is conveniently blamed on 
others. Under the subheading “Chaos and Catastrophe,” the authors 
state that “Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and their cronies colluded to create 
two counter-revolutionary organisations” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 
2013c: 33). Mao does come in for some criticism, but this is only for 
his apparent misapplication of the complex laws of Marxism:  
Mao incorrectly believed that there was revisionism in the party 
centre and that the party and country were facing the risk of a 
resurgence of capitalism. (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013c: 32) 
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One of the key recurring themes of the pre-modern-era textbooks is 
the concept of “rule by virtue” (ӱ᭯, renzheng). By way of back-
ground, this idea is linked to the ancient Confucian theory of the 
“Mandate from Heaven” (ཙભ, tianming) according to which rulers 
were selected by Heaven (ཙ, tian) because of their virtuous qualities 
and were therefore duty-bound to govern in an ethical manner in 
accordance with the will of Heaven – as reflected by the will of the 
common people. According to the Confucian disciple Mencius, 
“Heaven sees with the eyes of its people. Heaven hears with the ears 
of its people” (Lau 1979: 144). If a ruler failed to fulfil this duty he 
forfeited the source of his legitimacy and with it his divinely ordained 
entitlement to rule. Consequently, he could be legitimately over-
thrown by a new and virtuous ruler, himself now holding the Man-
date (ભ, ming). Rule by virtue is also sometimes referred to as “ben-
evolent government” (ӱ᭯,renzheng).  
Guo elaborates on this theory, noting how Confucian govern-
ment was “primarily an exercise of ethics” (Guo 2003: 4) to such an 
extent that government officials had to be schooled in the art of ben-
evolence as part of the qualification process. This process set the 
“gentleman” (ੋᆀ, junzi) apart from the “common” or “small man”  
(ሿӪ, xiaoren). Once in office, the gentleman assumed a position of 
moral authority over the common man and was expected to use this 
authority by setting a wise and virtuous example. As Mencius wrote,  
the virtue of the gentleman is like wind; the virtue of the small 
man is like grass. Let the wind blow over the grass and it is sure to 
bend. (Lau 1979: 96–97)  
In practise, a virtuous ruler was not only required to safeguard the 
moral welfare of the people but also their material welfare. Guo re-
fers to this as the principle of “benefitting the people” (⽬≁, li min) 
meaning that “rulers should not tax people heavily, should make sure 
people have enough food, shelter, and clothing and should control 
flood and relieve poverty” (Guo 2003: 6). In addition, a ruler “should 
not be pre-occupied with benefitting himself and indulging in his 
personal luxury and comfort” (Guo 2003: 6), as manifested by self-
sacrifice and plain living.  
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The foremost practitioners of rule by virtue, according to the 
pre-modern textbooks, were the historically revered (although not 
historically verified) sage kings Yao (2357–2256 BC), Shun (2255–
2205 BC), and Yu (2200–2100 BC). Under the tutelage of Yao, Shun 
was renowned for his willingness to work the fields with the common 
people and more generally for his devotion to the public good. Yu 
was well known for his introduction of flood control, which alleviat-
ed the suffering of his people and contributed to their prosperity. All 
three kings are lauded in Volume 1 of the Grade 7 textbook for “lov-
ing the people” and “sharing the joys and sorrows of the masses” 
(Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013a: 14).   
Later Chinese emperors are also applauded for their virtuous 
qualities. Tang Xuanzong (685–762), mentioned earlier, is acknow-
ledged for his contribution to culture, education, and economic 
wealth, and credited directly with “practising benevolent govern-
ment” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013b: 14). Sui Wendi (569–618), 
founder of the Sui Dynasty (581–619), is praised for ensuring that 
there were enough food supplies to last for at least 50 years. Both he 
and Tang are described as “fully exerting themselves to make the 
country prosperous” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013b: 3).   
The virtuous traits of self-sacrifice and plain living are accorded 
to revered Chinese rulers. Emperor Yao is commended for choosing 
a simple and prudent existence, during which he “wore clothes of 
coarse hemp and ate plain rice and soup of wild vegetables” (Renmin 
jiaoyu chubanshe 2013a: 14). Tang Taizong (598–649) is praised for 
“rejecting luxury and abiding by simplicity,” despite being better 
known among historians for his military and economic prowess 
(Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013b: 8). We are also told how, for a long 
time, Tang steadfastly refused to spend money on renovating his 
palace even though it was chilly and damp and was making him un-
well (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013b: 8). When Tang was finally 
persuaded to commence the renovations, he was considerate to his 
workforce so as not to be compared with notorious tyrants such as 
King Jie of the Xia Dynasty (1728–1675 BC) or King Zhou of Shang 
(1105–1046 BC), both of whom are borne out of Chinese legend – 
but are treated in the textbooks as historically verified.     
Han Wendi (202–157 BC) is also applauded for refusing to ex-
ploit his position of power by showering himself in luxury. Han ruled 
for more than two decades “without adding to his palace or gardens” 
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(Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013a: 67). Although he did once consider 
“building an open-air platform which would have cost a large sum of 
money,” he realised that “the amount of money would be equal to 
the incomes of ten ordinary families” and concluded that “if in inher-
iting the palace of the former emperor I already feel ashamed, how 
could I still think of building a platform?” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 
2013a: 68). In a similarly prudent vein, Han refused to have an expen-
sive tomb built for himself, requesting instead “that the tomb was 
simple and he did not allow the use of gold, silver or other such dec-
orations, only clay tiles could be used” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 
2013a: 67). Han also insisted on dressing modestly. “His clothes were 
rather coarse, and even his beloved wife was not permitted to wear 
long skirts which reached the floor” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 
2013a: 67).      
Just as frugal and self-sacrificing emperors are praised in the pre-
modern-era textbooks, so are those with profligate tendencies vilified. 
Sui Yangdi (569–618), second emperor of the Sui Dynasty, is derided 
as the epitome of self-indulgence in ordering the construction of the 
Grand Canal on a whim just so that he could view a flower in Yang-
zhou, which apparently wilted in protest at his tyranny rather than let 
him admire it! Moreover, in carrying out Sui’s orders to build the 
canal, countless numbers of his subjects perished (Renmin jiaoyu 
chubanshe 2013b: 2). Emperor Qin Shihuang (260–210 BC), famed 
for uniting China under the Qin Dynasty (221–207 BC), is roundly 
condemned for enforcing the construction of the Great Wall at tre-
mendous human cost (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013a: 62). Qin’s 
lavish burial tomb is contrasted to the simple one constructed for 
Han Wendi (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013a: 68).   
Leading on from this, both Qin and Sui are lambasted for their 
abuse of the people; Qin for “increasing the people’s burden” 
(Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013a: 62), Sui for “exhausting the people 
and draining the treasury” – for which he is described as an “unprin-
cipled tyrant” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013b: 7). King Jie, whose 
despotism brought about the collapse of the Xia Dynasty, is de-
scribed as being loathed by his subjects. As well as his cruelty, Jie had 
wildly extravagant culinary demands – the satisfaction of which re-
quired the service of hundreds of people from all over the country. 
Jin Huidi (259–307) of the Jin Dynasty (265–420) is criticised for 
dismissing the needs of his people by asking glibly “if the people have 
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no rice to eat, why not let them eat porridge?” (Renmin jiaoyu 
chubanshe 2013a: 108).  
3RSXODU&RQVHQW
Popular consent is a natural correlative of rule by virtue, in that a ruler 
who governs in accordance with such principles is likely to acquire this 
consent. According to Guo, a benevolent ruler strives constantly to 
attain the consent of his subjects “not by way of expressed public 
opinions but through winning the heart and minds of the people” 
(Guo 2003: 5). This formed a key tenet of the Mencian theory of “the 
people as the basis of the state” (≁ေ䛖ᵜ, minwei bangben) which held 
that governmental authority derived not from coercive laws or strong 
military control but from the people themselves. In order to under-
stand the people and obtain their consent, a ruler needed to listen to 
their wishes and govern accordingly. As Mencius wrote:  
There is a way to get the kingdom – get the people and the king-
dom is got. There is one way to get the people – get their hearts 
and the people are got. There is one way to get their hearts – it is 
simply to collect for them what they like, and not to lay on them 
what they dislike. The people turn to benevolent rule as water 
flows downwards, and as wild beasts fly to the wilderness. (Legge 
1970: 300)   
The importance attached to popular consent is more expressly stated 
in the modern-era section of the Chinese middle-school history sylla-
bus, as we will see shortly. That said, we can see from the previous 
section on rule by virtue that benevolent leaders were clearly con-
cerned with acquiring the support of the common people by govern-
ing in a considerate manner, while tyrannical ones had no such con-
cerns. For example, King Jie is claimed to have “lost the people’s 
hearts” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013a: 21) as a result of his bar-
baric rule.  
More clearly defined in the pre-modern textbooks are the conse-
quences of failing to secure the consent of the people. The textbooks 
show how dynasty after dynasty was overthrown for losing the sup-
port of the people through failing to address their material and spir-
itual needs. These rebellions are often portrayed in a positive manner 
by applying terms such as “uprising” (䎧ѹ, qiyi) as opposed to the 
more negative term “upheaval” (ࣘ㦑, dongdang) – later used to de-
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scribe the calamitous Cultural Revolution. The term “struggle” (ᯇҹ, 
douzheng) is also used, because of its positive association with class 
struggle or that against imperialism – being commonly referenced in 
the modern-era textbooks. Even uprisings that were unsuccessful are 
portrayed as justified if they were inspired by popular feelings of dis-
content towards those in charge. This is especially the case with the 
Taiping Rebellion (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013c: 14) against the 
oft-denigrated Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), not least because the Qing 
relied heavily on foreign military support in defeating the rebellion in 
1860.   
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An ongoing debate among some sinologists is whether or not equality 
was compatible with traditional Chinese political thinking, specifically 
Confucianism. In an attempt to establish a Confucian theory of hu-
man rights, Sim (2004) and Kim (2015) identify passages from the 
Analects and Mencius as clear evidence of a Confucian belief in 
equality. Others are less convinced. Lin Zexu and Ge Quan (1988) 
point to the entrenched moral and legal hierarchy of the Confucian 
social order as evidence of a Confucian antipathy towards such no-
tions of equality.  
Guo sides with the pro-equality school, suggesting that intrinsic 
to the idea of benefitting the people was the conviction that such 
benefits should be distributed on an equal basis. Indeed, Guo (2003: 
6) goes as far as suggesting that equality was so deeply embedded in 
Confucianism that the fair distribution of wealth was synonymous 
with the Confucian understanding of good governance and social 
justice. Guo points to Mencius’s support for the Zhou Dynasty’s 
(1046–256 BC) communal land system, which was used to facilitate 
the egalitarian allocation of this resource. He also cites the Tang Dyn-
asty’s equal field system, which assigned land to every adult (including 
women), and the espousal by Xu Xing (circa 315 BC) of “social 
equality,” drawing therein no distinction between scholar and manual 
worker or between ruler and ruled.   
Although the fair distribution of economic wealth features more 
commonly in the modern-era textbooks, there are a number of criti-
cal references to wealth inequality in the pre-modern-era ones too. 
There is a strong condemnation of how the gap between rich and 
poor was apparent even as far back as the Dawenkou stone age period 
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(approximately 3500–2500 BC), as evidenced by the excavation works 
that took place in 1959 (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013a: 10). The 
economic system of the Xia Dynasty (circa 2070–1600 BC) is derided 
for its inequality and described as “a tool of the slave owners op-
pressing the common people and slaves” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 
2013a: 20).  
A slightly different approach to equality, to which an entire chap-
ter is devoted in Volume 2 of the Grade 7 textbook, concentrates on 
equal access to the imperial examination system. This is praised as a 
breakthrough in meritocratic government, allegedly creating employ-
ment opportunities for people from all social backgrounds “giving 
talented and learned people the opportunity to enter into government 
posts of every rank and improving education and culture” (Renmin 
jiaoyu chubanshe 2013b: 19). Although there were similar exams in as 
early as the Han Dynasty (206 BC–AD 220), the imperial examination 
system became a major pathway to office in the mid-Tang Dynasty 
and is portrayed in the textbooks as a key innovation bestowed upon 
the people by virtuous Tang emperors – who modified and perfected 
the exams to ensure fairness and impartiality. This commitment to 
equality is illustrated in one part of the chapter when Tang Xuanzong 
is described as incandescent with rage on discovering that the talent-
less son of a senior official had been allowed to pass the exams purely 
because of his wealthy heritage (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013b: 18–
19). Another part of the chapter features lyrics from a popular Tang 
song describing candidates from all class backgrounds filing out of 
the exam hall. This is accompanied by several pictorial illustrations of 
the scene too (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013b: 18–19).  
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According to Guo (2003: 5), legality refers to the promulgation of a 
comprehensive set of laws. A ruler who governs in accordance with 
such laws is legitimate because he is deemed to be strong, well-
organised, and competent. Guo draws an analogy with “rule by law,” 
in that law in Chinese thinking was “considered to be a means to 
strengthen a ruler’s power” (2003: 5). This is different from the earli-
er-mentioned rule of law, in which “the ruler is also restrained by 
law” (Guo 2003: 5). Guo’s understanding of legality has strong echoes 
of the legalist approach adopted by successive Chinese dynasties, who 
relied heavily on detailed legal codes. These codes became “Confu-
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cian-ised” over the years, incorporating the familial and moral hier-
archy inherent in the Confucian social order such that the individual 
was treated by law in accordance with his or her position within this 
hierarchy (Bodde 1981).  
There is a strong focus in the pre-modern syllabus on legality. 
Notwithstanding criticism of Qin Shihuang’s brutality and extrava-
gance, he is commended for his success in “unifying the six states” 
and “establishing the first centralised, feudal state in our nation’s 
history” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013a: 56). Ming Taizu (1328–
1398) is praised for the comprehensiveness of his legal and institu-
tional reforms on founding the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), through 
which he  
reformed administrative structures and strengthened monarchical 
power, established three government departments directly under 
the control of the centre divided into civil, penal and military, 
abolished the imperial secretariat and established six departments 
which answered directly to the emperor. (Renmin jiaoyu 
chubanshe 2013b: 88)  
The laws and administrative institutions of several other dynasties are 
described in depth, without much evaluative comment. However, 
their frequent and detailed inclusion suggests their importance as a 
mode of legitimacy in the pre-modern-era textbooks.   
There is also admiration for those rulers who adhered to the legal 
procedures that they put in place. One notable example is Genghis 
Khan (favourably represented in the textbooks), who unified the 
Mongolian tribes after “he was properly elected at a great council of 
Mongolian aristocrats” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013b: 66). This 
draws parallels with Weber’s legal-rational theory of legitimacy.  
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Turning now to the portrayal of good governance in the modern-era 
history textbooks, it would be wrong to say this representation is 
entirely derived from the ancient Confucian models that we have 
examined above. As we might expect, there are a number of refer-
ences to the historical “inevitability” of Marxism – being asserted 
from the very beginning of the modern-era course. The progression 
of Chinese society is measured using Marx’s six stages of develop-
ment, and the textbooks refer frequently to the “exploiting” and “ex-
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ploited” classes in classic Marxist fashion. In the chapters on nine-
teenth-century China, there are references to the “natural evolution” 
of Chinese capitalism. Perhaps ironically, orthodox Confucian-style 
movements such as the “Pure View school” (␵᜿, qingyi) that sought 
to resist this phenomenon are criticised for attempting to forestall the 
apparently inexorable tide of capitalism (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 
2013c: 30).  
5XOHE\9LUWXH
Notwithstanding these and other references to Marxism, the influ-
ence of Confucianism is considerably more palpable in the modern-
era textbooks. Starting with rule by virtue, like his virtuous predeces-
sors from the imperial period, Mao is depicted as devoting himself 
wholeheartedly to the welfare of the Chinese people. For example, in 
an effort to secure peace with KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang 
Jieshi) prior to the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War, Mao is por-
trayed as risking life and limb for his country. Indeed, the people 
were so moved by Mao’s commitment to their welfare that they 
“cried hot tears” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013c: 89). Jiang Zemin 
is portrayed as working tirelessly for the welfare of the people, albeit 
in a very different context. He is quoted as saying:  
Based on our economic development, we must work hard to im-
prove the income of those in both the city and the countryside 
and constantly improve the people’s conditions in regards to food, 
clothing, housing, transport and utilities, perfect the social security 
system, improve health and well-being and increase the quality of 
life. (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 113)  
The Party as a whole is portrayed as ruling virtuously, particularly in 
its considerate treatment of “wrongdoers.” Examples include sparing 
Chiang’s life following his arrest by the CCP in December 1936 
(known as the “Xi’an incident”) and (allegedly) allowing former land-
lords their fair share of land during the Land Reform Campaign of 
1947–1951 (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 12).     
The Confucian traits of self-sacrifice and plain living are very ap-
parent in the modern-era textbooks. Mao is described as having en-
dured extreme poverty and adversity in his quest to liberate China 
from the chains of imperialism. The physical adversities of those who 
participated in the Long March are repeatedly emphasised and in-
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clude a poem by Mao that begins “the Red Army does not fear the 
hardship of the Long March” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013c: 59). 
Conditions under the CCP’s Yanan revolutionary base are described 
as “extremely difficult,” with Mao and the CCP Central Committee 
“commanding the whole operation from the gloom and cold of dug-
out caves” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013c: 59).  
Like Mao, Deng Xiaoping is presented as selfless in forfeiting 
personal luxury for the good of the people. One chapter contains an 
anecdote in which Deng repeatedly refused to burden a frail rickshaw 
driver sent to collect him as he arrived in Nanjing in 1945, with the 
Red Army having taken the city from KMT troops. Instead, Deng 
insisted on helping the old man push the rickshaw until Deng was 
“dripping with sweat.” The rickshaw driver was so moved by Deng’s 
actions that “hot tears filled his eyes” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 
2013c: 97). Another passage claims that Sun Yat-sen prevented an 
elderly merchant from kowtowing to him in accordance with ancient 
custom, insisting that “the president is no more than a servant of the 
people and must work for all the people of the nation” (Renmin 
jiaoyu chubanshe 2013c: 107).  
The emphasis on self-sacrifice in the modern-era textbooks can 
be linked to government policy, specifically the Party’s efforts to 
combat official corruption. One of the cornerstones of Xi Jinping’s 
incumbency is his anti-corruption drive, initiated in 2012 to crack 
down not just on high-profile cadres but also the local level that they 
exist on (so-called tigers and flies), who often incur the wrath of local 
residents by flaunting their wealth in driving expensive cars or living 
in fancy accommodation. Xi’s campaign is the biggest ever launched 
by the CCP, and has reportedly led to the indictment of over 100,000 
people – including over 120 high-ranking officials (China Power 
Team 2017). It has also been a useful tool for removing Xi’s political 
opponents, which in turned helped to clear the way for the constitu-
tional changes made in March 2018 that abolished the two-term limit 
on the Chinese presidency.   
3RSXODU&RQVHQW
The importance of popular consent and the people’s will features 
heavily in the modern-era textbooks. Mao’s decision to attend peace 
talks with Chiang in 1945, despite the likelihood that they were a trap, 
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is praised as representing the wishes of residents of Chongqing 
(where the talks took place):  
The citizens of Chongqing from every walk of life wrote to the 
Xinhua Daily to express their delight and their hopes for the peace 
talks. (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013c: 89)  
We are also told how the masses “urgently sought land reform” 
(Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 12), an aspiration to which the 
CCP were receptive and duly implemented. Party leaders are shown 
as striving hard for closer relations with Hong Kong (Deng) and 
Taiwan (Jiang) based on “the fervent desire and will of all Chinese 
people” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 69). This issue is presented 
in a highly subjective and emotive manner, by using expressions such 
as “the pain of being separated from one’s own flesh and blood” and 
featuring pictures of heartfelt reunions between relatives from the 
mainland China and Hong Kong or Taiwan (Renmin jiaoyu chuban-
she 2013c: 67). To add weight to this, there is a photo of people in 
Hong Kong celebrating the return of the territory to China in 1997 
(Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 61). In addition there is a song 
expressing the Macanese people’s wish to be reunited with the main-
land, ending with the line: “Mother, I want to come back, Mother!” 
(Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 62).  
The failure to secure popular consent is associated with illegiti-
mate rulers in the modern-era textbooks. We are told time and again 
how the KMT’s inability to unite China during the Nanjing Decade 
(1927–1937) and its defeat during the Chinese Civil War were due to 
a woeful neglect of the people’s will. Some CCP leaders are even 
described in this way. The rapid demise of Hua Guofeng is attributed 
to his reliance on the “Two Whatevers” (єњࠑᱟ, liangge fanshe), 
which “attracted the discontent of everyone across the country” 
(Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 18). Other vilified communist fig-
ures such as Lin Biao and Jiang Qing are described as acting contrary 
to the will of the people (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013c: 33).   
But the significance of popular consent in China goes beyond 
modes of legitimacy contained in Chinese history textbooks. In the 
absence of nationwide multiparty elections, the CCP is constantly at 
pains to insist that it came to power through a wave of popular sup-
port and derives its legitimacy by acting in accordance with the will of 
the people – often phrased as though this is part of its historical mis-
sion. For example, the Preamble to the 1982 constitution asserts that:  
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After waging hard, protracted and tortuous struggles, armed or 
otherwise, the Chinese people of all nationalities led by the Com-
munist Party of China with Chairman Mao Zedong as its leader, 
ultimately in 1949 overthrew the rule of imperialism, feudalism 
and bureaucratic capitalism, won the great victory of the new-
democratic revolution and founded the People’s Republic of Chi-
na. (National People’s Congress 2004)  
The modern-era textbooks serve to reinforce this oft-repeated per-
spective.   
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Equality is flagged as an important feature of good governance in the 
modern-era textbooks, as it is in the pre-modern-era ones too. Par-
ticular praise is heaped on the CCP for the success of the Land Re-
form Campaign, which aimed to ensure that every family was allocat-
ed land of roughly equal fertility. The campaign is also credited with 
ending exploitation, enhancing the material quality of people’s lives, 
and directly involving poor and landless peasants in its implementa-
tion. This is illustrated not just in the written text but also pictorially. 
For example, photographs of downtrodden peasants from the pre-
land reform era are carefully juxtaposed against those seemingly over-
come with joy in the wake of the campaign as they each receive the 
title deeds to their new land (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 12). 
Similar praise is accorded to the CCP’s drive towards further rural 
collectivisation during the 1950s, as family plots were merged into 
larger collective units and later communes. A model commune in 
Anyang county is singled out for acclaim as being both productive in 
its output of grain and egalitarian in its subsequent distribution 
(Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 23).   
The Party is commended for its more recent contributions to 
equality in areas such as employment, health insurance, and social 
security. This conveniently ties in with its ongoing attempts to coun-
ter the massive inequality created during the last three decades of 
economic reform, although unsurprisingly the textbooks do not say 
anything about the abandonment of the socialist principles of equality 
during the current reform era. For example, there is an optimistic 
mention of how under the new system, people, the work unit, and the 
state “share the burden three ways” (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 
2013d: 114). Equality of education under the CCP is also applauded, 
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most notably the national standardisation of Grade 9 education in the 
year 2000. This is accompanied by an anecdote about poor rural chil-
dren from Shanxi Province, who had previously wished for nothing 
more than the “sunlight of education to fall on them” (Renmin jiaoyu 
chubanshe 2013d: 98).   
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Turning finally to legality, as with the pre-modern-era textbooks, 
there is a strong emphasis on the importance of legal institutions and 
governing structures. Acclaim is given to some of the pivotal laws 
implemented during the early post-revolutionary period, including the 
1954 Constitution – described as “the first constitution in our coun-
try’s history to truly reflect the interests of the people” (Renmin 
jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 21). There is also support for the promulga-
tion in 1950 of the New Marriage Law and the Agrarian Reform Law 
(Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 12), both of which are portrayed as 
hugely significant in transforming the lives and improving the rights 
of Chinese citizens.  
Mao’s rise to power is littered with references to the formal 
measures that sanctioned his ascent, including his appointment to the 
Party’s Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) at the 1935 Zunyi Con-
ference (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013c: 60) and his election as 
Chairman of the Central Committee in 1949 (Renmin jiaoyu 
chubanshe 2013d: 2). This draws further on Weberian notions of 
legal-rational legitimacy, with Mao’s political ascent being achieved 
within the established legal parameters of the day. By contrast, three 
entire chapters of Volume 1 of the Grade 8 textbook are devoted to 
the many “errors” committed by Mao and other Party leaders during 
the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, when the power of 
his cult of personality was used to undermine the Party’s formal deci-
sion-making procedures.   
Deng Xiaoping is credited with the introduction of much-needed 
reforms to the legal system, in the wake of the often lawless Mao era. 
These reforms included a new constitution in 1982, new civil and 
penal codes, as well as legal reforms in education, employment, social 
security, and the environment (Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 40). 
Deng is commended for “using law to govern the country” and im-
plementing “socialism with Chinese characteristics, with the constitu-
tion as the nucleus,” which meant that “in political life, economic life, 
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and social and cultural life, the law could be relied on” (Renmin 
jiaoyu chubanshe 2013d: 40). 
The importance attached to laws and legality is also apparent in 
the praise given to international treaties and agreements to which 
China has acceded, and in particular to those which China has played 
a leading role in. Examples include Jiang’s chairmanship of the 2001 
APEC Conference (which resulted in the so-called Shanghai Consen-
sus) and the creation of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation in 
the same year, which is described in glowing terms as “the first inter-
national organisation named after a Chinese city” (Renmin jiaoyu 
chubanshe 2013d: 83).  
&RQFOXVLRQ
We have seen in this article how Chinese middle-school history text-
books portray the CCP as the standard-bearers of a distinctive Chi-
nese tradition of legitimate rule. This tradition is based on ancient 
theories espoused by Confucius and Mencius, and practised over the 
centuries by benevolent sage kings and virtuous emperors. Just to be 
clear, the link between past and present is not referred to explicitly in 
the textbooks. Nowhere does it say in emphatic terms that the CCP is 
the inheritor of a glorious Confucian legacy of good governance and 
simply continuing where its predecessors left off. There are at least 
two reasons for this. First, as noted at the beginning of the article, it 
is an unwritten rule that the content of history textbooks should 
maintain a veneer of objectivity, rather than overtly seek to persuade 
the reader of the author’s own (possibly revised) version of events. 
Second, the CCP is, after all, a communist party that came to power 
on the back of a strong anti-Confucian rhetoric. In effect, they are 
meant to represent a “new” China that got rid of the old ways of 
doing things rather than just continued with them.  
But the obvious overlap between traditional and modern modes 
of legitimacy is clearly more than just a coincidence or accident. The 
use of quasi-political themes has, as outlined, been key to the CCP’s 
legitimacy discourse for some time now; there are other examples of 
this too, for example “human rights.” In articulating an official Chi-
nese position on human rights since the early 1990s, the CCP has 
repeatedly been at pains to emphasise the historical and cultural con-
text of the concept – often as a defence against Western critics of its 
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human rights record (Information Office of the State Council 2016). 
This has precipitated a lively academic debate about the true philo-
sophical roots of Chinese human rights thinking, with some academ-
ics identifying a Chinese theory of rights with Confucian characteris-
tics as was revealed. A similar pattern has occurred in relation to Chi-
nese democracy, particularly since the publication of the CCP’s white 
paper on democracy (Information Office of the State Council 2005).  
In September 2015, PSC member Wang Qishan broke a long-
standing taboo by openly discussing the question of the CCP’s legiti-
macy at a high-profile international conference in Beijing. During his 
speech, Wang insisted that “the CCP’s legitimacy lies in history” (Ruan 
2015). Since then, there have been increasing suggestions that the 
CCP is preparing a white paper on legitimate governance. It seems 
likely from what we have seen in this article and from Wang’s speech 
that such a concept will be firmly rooted in China’s past.  
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